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The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium:
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THOMAS R. PALFREY California Institute of Technology
When two candidates of different quality compete in a one-dimensional policy space, the equi-librium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median. There are three maineffects. First, the better candidate adopts more centrist policies than the worse candidate. Second,
the equilibrium is statistical, in the sense that it predicts a probability distribution of outcomes rather than
a single degenerate outcome. Third, the equilibrium varies systematically with the level of uncertainty
about the location of the median voter. We test these three predictions using laboratory experiments and
find strong support for all three. We also observe some biases and show that they can be explained by
quantal response equilibrium.
Candidate quality differences can produce signif-icant changes in the nature of political com-petition. The equilibrium properties of spatial
competition between two candidates who differ in
quality have been analyzed theoretically and the aim
of this paper is to test them using experimental data.
The main properties are that higher-quality candidates
tend to choose more moderate locations and that uncer-
tainty about the median voter helps lower-quality can-
didates. We find that all the main qualitative proper-
ties of this equilibrium are clearly observed in the data
obtained from laboratory experiments. Moreover, the
results are robust across subject pools and experimental
context.
Candidate quality is widely considered to be a critical
variable in electoral competition.1 It affects the deci-
sions of politicians to run for office, campaign fund-
raising and advertising, voter behavior, election out-
comes, and, ultimately, policy outcomes. While direct
measurement of candidate quality is often elusive, few
doubt its importance in electoral politics. Quality dif-
ferences between two candidates can arise for many
reasons, including charisma, officeholding experience,
incumbency, advertising, scandal, and other nonpolicy
dimensions that can affect the relative attractiveness of
two candidates. Political scientists have demonstrated
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1 For example, most studies of the incumbency advantage in congres-
sional elections identify challenger quality as a critical factor. See,
e.g., Jacobson and Kernell (1981), Krasno (1994), and Squire (1992).
Incumbency itself can also be viewed as an indicator of quality.
over several decades of careful empirical research the
importance of these and other image factors, or the
“valence dimension,” as it is referred to in numerous
articles and books.2
It is obvious that, all else constant, high-quality candi-
dates will fare better than low-quality candidates. What
is less obvious, but equally important, is that quality
differences produce significant changes in the nature of
political competition. Recent papers by Ansolobehere
and Snyder (2000), Aragones and Palfrey (2002), and
Groseclose (2001) report a number of theoretical re-
sults about the equilibrium properties of spatial com-
petition between two candidates who differ in quality.3
The results are striking and suggest that the indirect
equilibrium effects of candidate quality differentials
may be even more important in determining candidate
policies and election outcomes than the direct effects
of producing more votes for one candidate than the
other.4
The main insight about spatial competition if the
candidates differ in quality (or along some other va-
lence dimension) is that the better candidate has an
incentive to copy the policies of the inferior candidate,
or at least move in that direction, while the disadvan-
taged candidate has the opposite incentive, to move away
from the advantaged candidate. Theoretically, the ad-
vantaged candidate will win all the votes if the two
candidates choose sufficiently similar policies. Thus, in
the standard Downsian model where candidates are
purely office-motivated, the disadvantaged candidate
must mix in order not to be predictable. However, in
order for mixing to be an equilibrium strategy for the
2 See, e.g., Kiewiet (1983), Kiewiet and Zheng (1993), and Stokes
(1963).
3 There are also some earlier theoretical papers that studied other
kinds of asymmetry, such as incumbency and partisanship, e.g.,
Adams (1999), Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985), Ingberman (1992),
and Londregan and Romer (1993).
4 Using a different approach, Banks and Kiewiet (1989) show that
candidate quality differentials can have important and surprising
equilibrium effects on the entry of challengers in congressional elec-
tions. Dasgupta and Williams (2002) study information aggregation
through polls in a principal-agent model with incomplete voter in-
formation about candidate quality. They report experimental results
supporting their rational expectations hypothesis.
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disadvantaged candidate, the advantaged candidate
also must be mixing.5
This implies the first of three key properties of equi-
librium in these models: The equilibrium makes sta-
tistical predictions, not point predictions. If both candi-
dates have complete information and symmetric beliefs
about voters, then the equilibrium is generally in mixed
strategies. If candidates have private information with
continuous types, then this mixed equilibrium can be
“purified.” That is, there will exist an equilibrium in
pure strategies, where the equilibrium locations of can-
didates will vary with this private information. More-
over, both the pure and the mixed strategies produce
distributions of location decisions that share similar sta-
tistical properties (Aragones and Palfrey 2004).
The second key property is that the distribution of
location decisions of the two candidates will be differ-
ent from each other, and the differences are systematic.
We call this the quality divergence hypothesis. The main
difference between the two candidate locations is that
the distribution of locations of the better candidate is
concentrated in the center of the policy space (i.e., the
expected location of the median voter), while the loca-
tion of the disadvantaged candidate tends toward the
extremes. That is, better candidates tend to choose more
moderate locations. Groseclose (2001) notes that this
is consistent with two regularities that have been iden-
tified in empirical studies of congressional elections.
One is the lack of support for the marginality hypothe-
sis, documented in Fiorina (1973). That is, Fiorina finds
that incumbents who are in marginal districts tend to
moderate less than incumbents from safe districts. This
is clearly consistent with the quality divergence hypoth-
esis. Second, a recent paper by Ansolobehere, Snyder,
and Stewart (2001) compares the spatial locations of
three categories of candidates: (1) incumbents seeking
reelection, (2) candidates for open seats, and (3) chal-
lengers running against an incumbent. They find that
incumbents are the most moderate, followed by open
seat candidates, and that challengers adopt the most
extreme positions. To the extent that quality correlates
across these three categories as expected, then this pro-
vides further corroboration of the quality divergence
hypothesis.
The third property is that the two candidates’ equi-
librium distributions of locations varies systematically
with the degree of uncertainty about the median voter.
Uncertainty helps the disadvantaged candidate, who
chooses more moderate locations as a strategic re-
sponse to greater uncertainty. This implies that the
quality divergence effect is weakest when there is a lot
5 An equilibrium in mixed strategies is guaranteed to exist (Aragones
and Palfrey 2002), and has intuitive properties. A pure strategy equi-
librium may exist if candidates obtain utility from winning policies
as well as from holding office, under certain conditions. Groseclose
(2001) studies the properties of stable pure strategy equilibria, un-
der the maintained assumption that they exist, but does characterize
conditions for existence. He presents an example suggesting that ex-
istence is especially problematic for small to intermediate values of
the quality advantage and if officeholding is the primary motivation
of candidates. The properties of pure strategy equilibria are similar
to those of mixed equilibria.
of uncertainty or if the electorate is highly polarized,
and the effect is strongest when there is little uncer-
tainty or a high degree of consensus in the electorate.
We call this the polarization hypothesis.
Because the nature of equilibrium is very subtle in
these asymmetric spatial competition games, and be-
cause the equilibrium (with complete information) is
mixed, one cannot help but be skeptical about whether
the features of the theoretical equilibrium might ac-
tually occur in practice. While the evidence put forth
by Groseclose (2001) is consistent with the quality di-
vergence hypothesis, that evidence could be explained
by other theories. For example, the correlation be-
tween incumbency (i.e., electoral success) and mod-
eration is also consistent with the standard Downsian
model or the more general models by Calvert (1985)
and Wittman (1983), which include policy motivations.
Thus, the evidence is suggestive that the theory may
be on the right track but does not provide a conclusive
test of the model. Unfortunately, the kind of field data
one would need to test these predictions is simply not
available, due to the difficulty of obtaining reliable and
accurate measurement of the “quality” variable, the
degree of uncertainty or polarization in the electorate,
and the location of candidates, and because the statisti-
cal nature of predictions would require a large number
of observations. We believe that direct testing of the
theory is needed.
With this in mind, we designed and conducted lab-
oratory experiments to test directly both the quality
divergence hypothesis and the polarization hypothesis.
By doing so, we hope to find out if the basic predictions
of the theory are accurate and, if not, what sort of mod-
ification of the theory might be required. This paper
reports and analyzes the data from those experiments.
There are three main findings. First, all of the qual-
itative predictions from the equilibrium theory were
clearly observed in the data. Both the quality diver-
gence hypothesis and the polarization hypothesis are
strongly supported by the data. Location decisions were
statistical, the advantaged candidates located more
centrally on average, and all of the comparative static
predictions of changes in the distribution of voters
were observed. In particular, when the distribution
of voters was more polarized, there was less diver-
gence. Second, the results are robust across subject
pools and experimental contexts. We used two subject
pools, one from California, USA, and the second from
Barcelona, Spain. While the subjects were university
students in both cases, they were from much different
backgrounds both culturally and politically. The results
are virtually identical in the two datasets. Most of the
experimental sessions were conducted in a context-free
setting, as is standard practice in controlled game the-
ory experiments. In addition, we conducted one ses-
sion where subjects played the role of vote maximizing
candidates in a sequence of two-candidate elections.
In each election, they selected policies. The number
of votes they received was a (commonly known) func-
tion of their policy and the policy of the opposing can-
didate. This function was constructed to be the same
as the “point” payoffs in the abstract setting. Subjects
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earned money in direct proportion to the number of
votes they received.6 Third, while the main hypothesis
were clearly supported, the exact distribution of loca-
tion choices was somewhat different from the quanti-
tative predictions of the theory in systematic and sur-
prising ways. There were two noteworthy differences:
(a) Both candidates showed a bias toward centrist
locations, relative to the theoretical predictions; and
(b) the disadvantaged candidate’s location distribution
was less responsive to changes in uncertainty than pre-
dicted by the theory.
In order to account for these anomalies, we consider
an extension of Nash equilibrium theory that allows
for a limited amount of bounded rationality. This ap-
proach, called Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE;
McKelvey and Palfrey 1995, 1996), is based on two
principles. The first principle is that players of any game
respond continuously, but imperfectly, to the incen-
tive structure of the game. While they do not optimize
perfectly, they will choose on average better strategies
more often than worse strategies. The second principle
is that players are aware that other players are also
imperfect and take this into account when choosing
their actions.
This boundedly rational version of Nash equilib-
rium often leads to surprising and unintuitive predic-
tions about behavior in games and provides a statisti-
cal model for data analysis. Recently this model has
been used in a number of political science applica-
tions, spanning empirical studies, experimental stud-
ies, and theoretical modeling. For example, Signorino
(1999) has applied it in a model of international conflict,
Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000) apply it to
jury decision making, and McKelvey and Patty (2002)
use it as a basis for a theoretical model of candidate
competition with probabilistic voting. To analyze our
data using this approach, we fit the data to the Logit ver-
sion of QRE. We find that the simplest one-parameter
version of that model provides an excellent fit to the
data and accounts for the two unexpected findings.
THE MODEL
We begin with a synopsis of the model and basic re-
sults of Aragones and Palfrey (2002). The reader is
referred to that paper for details. The policy space is
one-dimensional and consists of the set of n > 1 equally
spaced points on the [0, 1] interval.7 There are two
candidates, A and D, who are referred to as the ad-
vantaged candidate and the disadvantaged candidate,
respectively. Each candidate’s objective is to maximize
the probability of winning the election.8 Each voter has
a utility function, with two components, a policy com-
ponent and a candidate image component. The policy
6 Alternatively, we could have explained these payoffs as the prob-
ability of winning, with identical equilibrium predictions. We opted
for the vote maximization model because it is simpler to explain.
7 This is just a discrete version of the standard spatial model.
8 This is equivalent to a model of vote maximizing candidates facing
a known distribution of voters.
component is characterized by an ideal point in the pol-
icy space with utility of alternatives in the policy space
a strictly decreasing function of the distance between
the ideal point and the location of the policy, symmetric
around the ideal point. We assume that there exists a
unique median location. Candidates do not know the
exact location of the median voter but share a com-
mon prior belief about it. This commonly shared belief
is represented by a uniform distribution. The image
component of a voter’s utility is captured by a posi-
tive constant that is added to the utility each voter gets
if A wins the election.9 The image component is as-
sumed to be small, relative to the policy component of
utility.
The game takes place in two stages. In the first stage,
candidates simultaneously choose positions in the pol-
icy space. In the second stage, each voter votes for
the candidate whose victory would yield the higher
utility.
A pure strategy equilibrium is a pair of candidate
locations such that both candidates are maximizing the
probability of winning given the choices of the other
candidate. A mixed strategy equilibrium is a pair of
probability distributions over locations such that both
candidates are maximizing the probability of winning
given the mixed strategy of the other candidate.
There are five main results, each of which we state
without proof.10
Result 1: There does not exist a pure strategy equi-
librium.11
Result 2: There exists an essentially unique equilib-
rium in mixed strategies.
Result 3: The distribution of D’s equilibrium strategy
is U-shaped (with a local minimum at the expected
median).
Result 4: The distribution of A’s equilibrium strategy
is single-peaked (at the expected median).
Result 5: The probability that A wins is higher than
the probability that D wins.
Summarizing, the main results are that there exists
an essentially unique equilibrium in symmetric mixed
strategies with no gaps. In this equilibrium, A is the
more likely candidate to win. That is, A’s quality ad-
vantage leads to an electoral advantage. The supports
of the equilibrium mixed strategies are the same, but
otherwise the two distributions of the two candidates’
are much different. The better candidate is more likely
to locate in the center of the policy space than at the
extremes, while the opposite is true for the lower-
quality candidate. The latter property follows from
results 3 and 4, and we call it the quality divergence
effect.
9 The constant could be different for different voters. For simplicity,
we have assumed that it is the same.
10 There are some additional technical assumptions. The reader is
referred to Aragones and Palfrey (2002) for formal statements and
proofs of these results.
11 Versions of this proposition can be found in Berger, Munger, and
Potthoff (2000) and Groseclose (2001). Ansolobehere and Snyder
(2000) contains some related results.
79
Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium February 2004
THE EQUILIBRIUM EFFECTS
OF UNCERTAINTY
This paper conducts an experiment to test a number
of the predictions of the theoretical model. We use a
variation on this model that can be solved explicitly
for arbitrary distributions of the median voter. This
is important because the equilibrium strategies of the
candidates are sensitive to the distribution and vary in
systematic ways with the distribution. This variation,
in which candidates can choose one of only three lo-
cations (left, center, right), also has the virtue of being
quite simple and intuitive to explain to subjects.12 This is
important in the laboratory context, since we use naive
subjects who have had no real experience in candidate
location games.13
Denote the three possible locations, L, C, and R,
for left, center, and right, respectively, where L < C <
R. The probability that the median voter is located
at ideal point L is denoted α; similarly the proba-
bility of being located at ideal point C or R is de-
noted β and γ , respectively, with α + β + γ = 1. Sup-
pose that the utility functions of the voters are as
described in the previous section, and assume that
|(R− C) − (C − L)| < δ < max{(C − L), (R− C)}.14 To
maintain symmetry in the problem, we assume that
α = γ ≤ 12 . Since α + β + γ = 1, this implies that α ≤ 12
and β = 1 − 2α, so the model is reduced to a single
parameter, α, which is proportional to the variance of
the distribution. Thus, we call α the uncertainty (or po-
larization) index.15 When α > 13 , the distribution of the
median voter’s ideal point is bimodal. We refer to this
as the case of high uncertainty. When α < 13 , the distri-
bution of the median voter’s ideal point is unimodal.
We refer to this as the case of low uncertainty. The
case of α = 13 is called the uniform case. The degree of
uncertainty, low, uniform, or high, is the primary treat-
ment variable in the experiment. Hence it is important
to understand how the equilibrium varies along this
dimension of uncertainty, or polarization. We explain
this below.
The payoff matrix for the game is given in Table 1,
where A is the row player and D is the column player.
The (unique) mixed equilibrium is solved in the stan-
dard way and yields the following pair of equilibrium
12 This method is also used in the Dasgupta and Williams (2002)
experiment.
13 A completely general solution to this three-location model is given
in Aragones and Palfrey (2002). We present only a synopsis of the
derivation here.
14 That is, the quality advantage is large enough, so a C-location voter
will vote for L, when the two candidates choose opposite extremes,
but small enough that voters at D’s location will vote for D unless
A is also located there. If the quality advantage is outside this range,
the equilibria are trivial and uninteresting.
15 Formally this model is equivalent to a model in which the popula-
tion distribution of the voters’ ideal points is given by (α, β, γ ) and
each candidate maximizes the expected vote. In this context, α can
also be interpreted as a measure of the polarization of the electorate.
If α > 13 , the distribution of voters is bimodal, while if α <
1
3 , the
distribution of voters is more concentrated in the center. Because the
two versions of the model yield results that are formally equivalent,
we use the terms uncertainty and polarization interchangeably, and
both terms refer to the level of α.
TABLE 1. Payoff Matrix for 3 × 3 Game
L C R
L 1, 0 α, 1 − α 1 − α, α
C 1 − α, α 1, 0 1 − α, α
R 1 − α, α α, 1 − α 1, 0
strategies
σ AL = σ AR =
α
2 − α , σ
A
C =
2 − 3α
2 − α ,
σ DL = σ DR =
1 − α
2 − α , σ
D
C =
α
2 − α .
To simplify notation, we denote the equilibrium
(p∗, q∗), where p∗ = σ AC and q∗ = σ DC are the equi-
librium probabilities that A and D locate in the cen-
ter position, respectively. The probabilities of locating
at L (or R) are therefore (1 − p∗)/2 and (1 − q∗)/2,
respectively. Using this notation, the equilibrium is
p∗ = (2 − 3α)/(2 − α) and q∗ = α/(2 − α).
This equilibrium solution has several interesting
properties. First, note that since α ≤ 12 , this implies that
σ AL ≤ σ AC and σ DL ≥ σ DC . This implies the quality diver-
gence hypothesis: The advantaged candidate is most
likely to locate at the center, while the opposite is true
for the disadvantaged candidate, who is more likely
to locate on the extremes. This holds generally for all
values of α.
Second, the comparative statics with respect to the
uncertainty index, α, are very interesting and a bit sur-
prising and counterintuitive. First, ∂p∗/∂α < 0, so that
as uncertainty increases (or the electorate becomes
more polarized) the advantaged candidate becomes
more likely to adopt an extreme policy. Surprisingly,
the opposite is true for the disadvantaged candidate.
That is, ∂q∗/∂α > 0, implying that the disadvantaged
candidate becomes more likely to adopt a centrist policy
as uncertainty increases. In other words, as the polar-
ization index increases, the advantaged candidate tends
to move away from the center and the disadvantaged
candidate moderates. This is the polarization hypoth-
esis. In the extreme case, when α = 12 (i.e., the median
is at one of the two extremes), both candidates mix
uniformly over the three locations.
Finally, uncertainty benefits the weaker candidate.
The equilibrium probability that D wins is given by:
∗D(α) =
2α(1 − α)
2 − α .
The change in this equilibrium probability as α changes
is found by computing the derivative of ∗D(α), which
is given by
d∗D(α)
dα
= 2
[
1 − 2α
2 − α +
α(1 − α)
(2 − α)2
]
> 0.
The derivative is positive because α ≤ 12 . Notice that
if there is very little uncertainty (α close to 0),
the disadvantaged candidate almost never wins. The
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TABLE 2. Experiment Session Summary
No. No.
Uncertainty (p∗, q∗) Subjects UPF CIT Rounds
Uniform (α = 13 ) ( 35 , 15 ) 44
Session 1 10 x 200
Session 2 8 x 200
Session 3 14 x 200
Session 4a 12 x 200
Low (α = 15 ) ( 79 , 19 ) 40
Session 1 14 x 200
Session 2 10 x 200
Session 3 16 x 200
High (α = 37 ) ( 511 , 311 ) 38
Session 1 8 x 166
Session 2 14 x 200
Session 3 16 x 200
a Political context.
probability D wins reaches its maximum value of 13
when α = 12 .
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
AND PROCEDURES
We conducted laboratory experiments using three val-
ues of α, corresponding to three levels of uncertainty.
The three values were α = 1/3 (uniform), α = 1/5 (low
uncertainty), and α = 3/7 (high uncertainty). The ex-
periments used students from the California Institute
of Technology (CIT; Caltech) and Universitat Pompeu
Fabra (UPF). Nine sessions were conducted, three for
each value of α, of which two were carried out at CIT
and one at UPF. Table 2 summarizes the information
about each session. In addition, there was an additional
Caltech uniform session run in a political context. The
procedures are described in the next section.
Procedures
The experiments were conducted using software de-
veloped at the Hacker Social Science Experimental
Laboratory at Caltech. The interface for the software
presents each subject with a matrix of payoffs and keeps
track of the history of previous game outcomes auto-
matically for each subject. The matrix of payoffs was
strategically equivalent to the three-location games, but
constants were added to the payoffs to avoid zero out-
comes and to approximately equalize the payoff mag-
nitudes for A and D players.
Each session lasted 200 rounds, each round being
one play of the game.16 Between eight and 16 subjects
participated in each session. Total earnings were equal
to the sum of all earnings over the 200 rounds. Average
earnings were $20 and sessions lasted about 90 min.17
16 The first High session was terminated after round 166 due to a
computer crash.
17 For the experiments conducted at UPF, earnings averaged
13 Euros.
Each subject played both roles (A and D). At the
beginning of the session, subjects were assigned to be
either row or column players and instructions were read
aloud. The game matrix was displayed in front of the
room for everyone to see. It also appeared on their
computer screen. In each round, row players clicked
their mouse on a row to make a decision and column
players clicked on a column to select their decision.
After everyone had made a decision, the row/column
outcome of their match was highlighted in the ma-
trix on their screen. The screen also kept a display
of the history of their play and the choices made by
their past opponents. Several practice rounds were con-
ducted in order to familiarize the subjects with the
computer interface. During these practice rounds, the
subjects were not allowed to make any choices on their
own.
The subjects then played 100 rounds, being randomly
rematched into pairs (one column player and one row
player) after each round of play. After round 100,
the payoff matrix was changed so that the row and
column players’ roles were reversed. That is, the col-
umn player’s payoffs now corresponded to what a row
player’s payoffs had been in the first 100 rounds, and
vice versa. This reversal was carefully explained to the
subjects. They played 100 additional times with these
reversed roles. This reversal allowed each row subject
to have 100 rounds of experience as the A player and
100 rounds of experience as the D player, and the same
for each column player. For all sessions except the po-
litical context session, the instructions were worded in
neutral terms that would not be associated with per-
sonal political ideology. The three strategies were la-
beled A, B, and C. A sample copy of the instructions is
given in the Appendix.
For the political context session, the subjects were
told that they were adopting the role of political can-
didates, and they would be choosing policy platforms
over a sequence of 200 elections. The number of votes
they received in an election depended on their policy
and the policy of the other candidate in the election.
They were allowed to choose from a menu of three
policies, generically called A, B, and C. The number of
votes each candidate received as a function of pairs
of policies (one for each candidate in the election)
was determined in exactly the same way as the pay-
offs from the neutral uniform treatment. Subjects were
paid a constant amount for each vote they received.
As in the neutral context experiments, each subject
played 100 times in the role of the A candidate and
100 times in the role of the D candidate. Therefore,
this session was strategically identical to the other uni-
form treatments, the only difference being the political
context.
Hypotheses
We have the following comparative static hypotheses
that are derived from the theory. They are summarized
below, denoting the empirical choice frequencies of
center ( pˆ, qˆ) and the treatments H, M, and L(for high,
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TABLE 3. The Entries in Each Cell Correspond to the Difference Between Row and Column in
Relative Frequency of Choosing Center
pˆL pˆM pˆH 13 qˆH qˆM qˆL
pˆL — 0.160∗∗ 0.255∗∗ 0.436∗∗ 0.449∗∗ 0.481∗∗ 0.517∗∗
pˆM — 0.095∗∗ 0.276∗∗ 0.289∗∗ 0.321∗∗ 0.357∗∗
pˆH — 0.181∗∗ 0.194∗∗ 0.226∗∗ 0.262∗∗
1
3 — 0.013∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.081∗∗
qˆH — 0.032∗∗ 0.068∗∗
qˆM — 0.036∗∗
qˆL —
Note: ∗ Significant at better than 5% level. ∗∗ Significant at better than 1% level.
medium, and low uncertainty)
1. pˆL > pˆM > pˆH.
2. qˆL < qˆM < qˆH.
3. qˆ < 13 < pˆ for all uncertainty treatments.
This implies the following string of inequalities:
qˆL < qˆM < qˆH <
1
3
< pˆH < pˆM < pˆL.
Summarizing, there are four primary hypotheses
based on the Nash equilibrium model. The first hypoth-
esis states that disadvantaged candidates will choose
the center location less than one-third of the time, re-
gardless of the level of uncertainty. The second hypoth-
esis states that advantaged candidates will choose the
center location more than one-third of the time, regard-
less of the level of uncertainty. Thus hypotheses 1 and
2 jointly imply the quality divergence hypothesis. The
third hypothesis states that disadvantaged candidates
will choose the center location more often as the level
of uncertainty increases. The fourth hypothesis states
that advantaged candidates will choose the center lo-
cation less often as the level of uncertainty increases.
Thus hypotheses 3 and 4 jointly imply the polarization
hypothesis.
RESULTS
The main results of the paper have to do with the effect
of the primary treatment variable (level of uncertainty)
on the location decisions of the subject candidates. The
key observation from the experimental results is that all
four of the main hypotheses of the theory are strongly
supported by the aggregate data from this experiment.
The Nash equilibrium order of center choice relative
frequencies, qˆL < qˆM < qˆH < 13 < pˆH < pˆM < pˆL, is ex-
actly what is found in the data. Table 3 clearly shows
the support for all of these theoretical hypotheses. That
table displays the differences between pairs of aggre-
gate choice frequencies.18 The cell entries in the ta-
ble correspond to the difference in the relative fre-
quency of center choices for two treatments (or one
treatment compared with 13 ). For example, the entry
18 For comparability reasons, the results presented include only data
from the neutral context sessions. The findings from the political con-
text session are discussed separately. However, it is important to note
that none of the results change by pooling data from both contexts.
in the cell with row label pˆL and column label pˆM is
pˆL − pˆM = 0.769 − 0.609 = 0.160. Every single one of
the 21 predicted differences has the correct sign, and
all except one are statistically significant at better than
the 1% level.
With the exception of the bimodal treatment, the
aggregate fit for the A players to the quantitative pre-
diction of Nash equilibrium was nearly perfect. The
quantitative fit for the D players is not nearly as good,
and the error was in the direction of overplaying the
center strategy in all cases.19 The Aplayers overplayed
the center strategy in two of three treatments (the ex-
ception being the L treatment, where the difference
is very small.) In addition, the D players do not re-
spond very strongly to the treatment effects. That is, the
differences between qˆ in the different treatments was
always less than predicted by the theory. Thus, while
the qualitative features of the data are very supportive
of the theory, the actual magnitudes of ( pˆ, qˆ) in the
various treatments deviate somewhat from the Nash
equilibrium predictions in systematic ways.
To summarize, there are seven main features of the
aggregate data.
1. The quality divergence hypothesis is strongly sup-
ported by the data.
2. The polarization hypothesis is strongly supported by
the data.
3. All of the signed comparative static predictions
about p and q are strongly supported by the data.
4. All of these comparative static differences are sta-
tistically significant.
5. The A player fits the Nash predictions much better
than the D player.
6. Both players tend to overplay the center strategy,
and this effect is strongest for the D players.
7. The response of the Dplayers to changes in the level
of uncertainty is less than predicted.
QUANTAL RESPONSE EQUILIBRIUM
ANALYSIS
The strategic structure of equilibrium suggests the fol-
lowing possible explanation. If D players begin with
19 Another quantitative feature of the data is that subjects do not
play L and R with equal frequency. There is a small (but statistically
significant) difference between R frequencies and L frequencies, for
both Aand D players, with R played more frequently than L.
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uninformative prior beliefs about the choices by A
players, then locating in the center is their optimal
choice. The same is true for the A players. This could
produce a pattern in which both players initially over-
play C, then gradually adapt in the direction of their
equilibrium strategy. Since in this kind of process D
starts out farther away from his equilibrium strategy
than A, it is not surprising that A frequencies are closer
to their equilibrium values than D frequencies. What
is needed to capture this idea theoretically is a model
that can predict one player to be farther from Nash
equilibrium than the other player.
QRE is an equilibrium model of imperfect play. A
quantal response function is simply a smoothed out
single-valued best response function that is monoton-
ically increasing in expected payoffs. The quantal re-
sponse functions are continuous and “statistical” in
the sense that all strategies are played with positive
probability. Therefore, players do not always play best
responses. However, the monotone property implies
that they play better strategies more frequently than
worse strategies. Formally, for each player, the quantal
response function maps the vector of expected payoffs
of feasible actions into mixed strategy, which satisfies
monotonicity and continuity properties. A QRE is a
fixed point of the following composed mapping. Let σ
be some (mixed) strategy profile in the game. Given
σ , one can compute, for each player i and for each of
player i ’s possible actions j , the expected payoff from
playing that action, given σ , denoted Ui j . Given these
vectors of expected payoffs, the quantal response func-
tions of players then yield a new mixed strategy pro-
file, σˆ = Q(σ ). A QRE is a fixed point of this mapping,
that is, a mixed strategy profile, σ ∗, with the property
that σ ∗ = Q(σ ∗). McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) estab-
lish a number of theoretical properties of QRE points,
including existence and upper hemicontinuity and a
connection between QRE and Bayesian equilibrium
of games with payoff disturbances.
A particularly useful parametric form of QRE is the
Logit equilibrium. The Logit equilibrium arises when
all players’ quantal response functions are Logit func-
tions of the expected utilities that are implied by the
mixed strategies.20 Formally, a Logit quantal response
function is given by
σˆ i j = e
λUi j (σ )∑
k eλUik(σ )
,
where λ is a parameter measuring the responsiveness of
i to payoff differences between strategies. A Logit equi-
librium is therefore a mixed strategy profile σ ∗ such that
σ ∗i j =
eλUi j (σ
∗)∑
k eλUik(σ
∗)
for all i and j.
When λ = 0, behavior is completely random, and the
unique Logit equilibrium has every player choosing ac-
20 Hence the Logit equilibrium is the game theoretic extension of the
standard Logit model of discrete choice that is commonly employed
in empirical estimation of individual choice models. See McFadden
(1976) for a survey of the Logit and related models of quantal choice.
tions according to a uniform distribution. When λ → ∞,
the Logit equilibria converge to Nash equilibria. The
Logit equilibrium correspondence for a game is the set
of all Logit equilibria for the game, for each nonneg-
ative value of λ. Because of its simple functional form,
Logit equilibria are relatively easy to compute numer-
ically and, in some cases, analytically. Gambit software
(1999) was used for the calculations and figures above.
Figure 1 displays the graphs of the Logit equilibrium
correspondences for each of the primary treatments.
Logit equilibrium choice probabilities are on the verti-
cal axis and λ is on the horizontal axis. Each graph has
two curves, one for the probability of choosing center
and a second that is the probability of choosing left (by
symmetry equal to the probability of choosing right).
From the graphs, one can see how the QRE captures
the intuition that the Aplayers converge more quickly
to the Nash equilibrium, while the D players converge
slowly. Neither converges monotonically. For interme-
diate values of λ, both players overplay C relative to
Nash equilibrium.
The Logit equilibrium correspondence provides a
structural model that permits us to fit the data to QRE
using standard maximum likelihood techniques. Given
a dataset consisting of n observations of A and D
choices in the location game, one can construct the like-
lihood function as a function of the free parameter, λ,
which is determined by the theoretical choice probabil-
ities of the unique Logit equilibrium for that value of λ.
The maximum likelihood estimate of λ is the value of λ
at which that likelihood function is maximized. This pa-
rameter estimate in turn implies estimated equilibrium
choice frequencies ( pˆ∗, qˆ∗) using the formula above.
Figure 2 includes the fitted QRE-predicted choice
probabilities of A and D, as well as the Nash predictions
and the aggregate data. The QRE model clearly picks
up the three anomalous features of the data: overplay
of center by both players, the worse fit of D compared
to A, and the weaker responsiveness by D to changes
in uncertainty.
Table 4 presents the QRE estimates of the data bro-
ken down by treatment and model. Column 1 lists the
three treatments, uniform, low, and high, and the num-
ber of observations of each treatment. We computed
estimates for three models, which we call the uncon-
strained model, the constrained model, and the Nash
FIGURE 2. QRE Estimates and the Data
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TABLE 4. QRE Estimation Results
Treatment Model pˆ∗ qˆ∗ p¯ q¯ λˆ −logL χ2
Uniform (N = 6,400) Unconstrained 0.616 0.289 0.609 0.288 1.04 6,510
Constrained 0.618 0.266 1.43 6,515 8.70a
Nash equilibrium 0.600 0.200 ∞ 6,580 140a
Low uncertainty (N = 8,000) Unconstrained 0.803 0.261 0.769 0.252 1.55 7,150
Constrained 0.800 0.272 1.43 7,151 2.66b
Nash equilibrium 0.778 0.111 ∞ 7,441 582a
High uncertainty (N = 7,328) Unconstrained 0.462 0.312 0.514 0.320 1.22 7,817
Constrained 0.462 0.306 1.43 7,817 .92b
Nash equilibrium 0.455 0.273 ∞ 7,839 44a
a Model restriction rejected at 1% significance level or better.
b Model restriction cannot be rejected at 10% significance level.
TABLE 5. QRE Estimates of Experience Effects
pˆ∗ qˆ∗ p¯ q¯ λˆ −logL
Uniform
Inexperienced 0.611 0.307 0.623 0.307 0.856 3,257
Experienced 0.618 0.270 0.594 0.269 1.35 3,251
Low uncertainty
Inexperienced 0.800 0.270 0.763 0.260 1.46 3,605
Experienced 0.804 0.251 0.775 0.245 1.68 3,544
High uncertainty
Inexperienced 0.461 0.315 0.516 0.324 1.15 4,051
Experienceda 0.462 0.310 0.512 0.315 1.32 3,765
a Two hundred seventy-two fewer observations than previous row.
model, respectively. The unconstrained estimates allow
a separate estimate of λ for each treatment, while the
constrained estimate forces λˆ to be the same for all
treatments. The Nash model computes the likelihood
function using the Nash equilibrium choice probabili-
ties, which correspond to the limit of the QRE choice
probabilities when λ → ∞.
Columns 3 and 4 give ( pˆ∗, qˆ∗), the estimated choice
probabilities under the various models. Columns 5 and
6 give ( p¯, q¯), the empirical relative frequencies ob-
served in the experiment.21 Column 7 gives the max-
imum likelihood estimate of λ, and column 8 gives
minus the value of the log likelihood function for the
model, evaluated at the maximum likelihood estimate
of λ.
The constrained model is nested in the unconstrained
model, so we use a likelihood ratio test to test for model
rejection. The chi-square statistic (twice the log of the
likelihood ratio) is given in the last column in Table 4.
While the unconstrained model fits slightly better in all
three cases, the improvement in fit is insignificant (at
the 10% level) for two of the treatments (bimodal and
unimodal). Only with the uniform treatment is it sta-
tistically significant (at the 1% level), but even for this
case, the improvement in fit is of little real consequence,
as the implied differences for choice probabilities be-
tween the two models are negligible.
21 The data for QRE estimation include only observations from the
neutral context treatment, in order to avoid confounding compar-
isons across the primary treatments (subject pool and distribution of
voters). The estimates for those data are virtually the same as the
estimates for the uniform treatment.
The Nash equilibrium model is also (approximately)
nested in the unconstrained model, so we can again
use a likelihood ratio test to test for model rejection.
The Nash model is easily rejected for all treatments,
and the differences are statistically significant at any
conventional level.
EXPERIENCE AND LEARNING
We investigate learning at a macro scale, simply asking
whether aggregate behavior was different after subjects
had a chance to observe the pattern of behavior of
their opponents. Recall that our design used random
matching, so that subjects were not trying to outguess
an opponent based on observation of that opponent’s
play. Instead, the subjects were receiving information
about he average play of the population over time. For
this reason, this subsection focuses on changes in aver-
age play over the course of a session.
We divide the data into two data subsets; we call one
experienced and the other inexperienced. Since subjects
played 100 rounds in each candidate’s role, we define
inexperienced rounds to be the first 50 rounds a sub-
ject was in a particular round and define experienced
rounds to be the remaining 50 rounds a subject was
in that role.22 There were clear and significant trends
in the data, with the experienced data being closer
to Nash equilibrium and also fitting the QRE model
better. Also, in all cases the estimate of λˆ increases
22 In the case of the experiment that crashed, we lost 34 rounds of
experienced data.
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FIGURE 3. QRE Estimates and the Data: The
Effect of Experience
with experience, and the changes are significant at the
1% level or better. However, in most cases, the actual
movement in the aggregate choice probabilities was
not very large. Table 5 displays the estimates broken
down separately by treatment and by experience level.
Figure 3 compares the inexperienced and experienced
data in a graph similar to Figure 2.
HETEROGENEITY, SUBJECT POOL
EFFECTS, AND CONTEXT EFFECTS
This section examines variation in choice behavior
across subjects. We find evidence for heterogeneity.
Even with the heterogeneity, all of the comparative
statics results are still supported in the data. This is
FIGURE 4. Choice Frequencies: Individual-Level Data
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important to note because the statistical tests in the
earlier section assume that all observations are inde-
pendent, and therefore the significance levels are in-
flated. One way to adjust for this is to conduct simi-
lar tests with the individual-level data, comparing the
population distribution of choice probabilities across
samples, using nonparametric statistics. This is what we
do here, with the pooled sample of individuals. Figure 4
shows the cumulative distributions of individual choice
frequencies by treatment and by role. For example,
in the uniform treatment, there were 32 subjects, so
the graph shows 32 center choice frequencies for the
individuals when they were A players and 32 choice
frequencies for the same individuals when they were
D players. Each point on the graph gives the rela-
tive frequency (of 100 moves) that a particular indi-
vidual chose the center strategy in a particular rule.
The points are ordered by relative frequency (not sub-
ject), so that the curves represent empirical cumulative
distribution functions (CDFs) of individual choice fre-
quencies. There is a clear ordering of these empirical
CDFs as hypothesized. A second issue with hetero-
geneity arises because we used two separate subject
pools.
This feature of the design was implemented as a ro-
bustness check. The student populations (and culture)
at UPF and CIT are different in many ways, but the
theoretical model is intended to apply to both subject
pools, so we do not predict a difference. Figure 5 dis-
plays the UPF and CIT data as well as the Nash pre-
dictions and the QRE estimates.
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FIGURE 5. Subject Pool and Context Effects
Indeed the behavior in the two subject pools is very
similar, with some small quantitative differences. There
is one reversal of the sign predictions, which occurs in
the CIT data. That reversal is qˆL,CIT > qˆM,CIT, but the
difference (−0.016) is not significant at the 5% level.
The uniform session conducted with a political con-
text yielded results similar to those of the other uniform
sessions. The relative frequencies for A and D locating
in the center position were 0.652 and 0.278, respec-
tively. This datapoint is displayed as a shaded triangle
in Figure 5. To test for significant differences between
this and the neutral uniform sessions, we used the Logit
equilibrium as the structural model and conducted a
likelihood ratio test between the constrained and the
unconstrained estimates. The chi-square statistic is .88
with one degree of freedom, which is insignificant at all
conventional significance levels (p≈ .5).
CONCLUSIONS
The results of this laboratory experiment provide
strong support for the theoretical equilibrium effects of
candidate quality on policy location. The central predic-
tions of the theory are the quality divergence hypoth-
esis and the polarization hypothesis. That is, (1) both
candidates diverge from the center, with the weaker
candidate diverging more than the stronger candidate;
and (2) as the distribution of voters becomes more
spread out, both candidates moderate their positions.
The design allowed us to test these key predictions
about how endogenous variables (candidate locations)
covary with candidate quality and with the distribution
of voters. All of these predictions were supported by
the data. Altogether, the design and the model offer 21
predicted sign differences in the observable choice fre-
quencies by the candidates, across the three treatments.
Every single one of these 21 predicted sign differences
was the correct sign according to the theory, and all of
these differences were statistically significant.
The quantitative predictions of the theory were also
the right order of magnitude, but there were two in-
teresting biases that were observed. First, we found
that when subjects were in the role of the advantaged
candidate they were more responsive to the changes
in the distribution of voters than when they were in
the role of the disadvantaged candidate. As a result the
Nash equilibrium predictions fit the data for advan-
taged candidates better than the data for the disadvan-
taged candidates. Second, on average, subjects in both
roles adopt more moderate positions than predicted by
the model. We show that both of these observations can
be accounted for very well by a bounded rationality
version of Nash equilibrium, called quantal response
equilibrium.
The experiment not only shows robustness of the
model with respect to bounded rationality, but also
demonstrates robustness of behavior across subject
pools and with respect to experimental context. The lat-
ter is important for considerations of external validity
of the results. Neither of the two secondary treatments
(subject pool and context) had any effect on the qual-
itative conclusions of the experiment. The behavior in
the two subject pools (from two different countries)
was qualitatively identical and quantitatively very sim-
ilar. Behavior in the political context treatment was
not significantly different from behavior in the neutral
context sessions. This suggests robustness of the basic
game theoretic predictions of the model, at least with
respect to these sorts of considerations, and this ro-
bustness leads us to be optimistic about its relevance to
electoral politics.
APPENDIX: SAMPLE INSTRUCTIONS
Welcome to the SSEL Lab. Please do not do anything with the
computer equipment until you are instructed to. Please put
all of your personal belongings away, so we can have your
complete attention. Raise your hand if you need a pencil.
Feel free to adjust your chairs so they are comfortable for
you.
This is an experiment in decision making, and you will be
paid for your participation in cash, at the end of the experi-
ment. Different subjects may earn different amounts. What
you earn depends partly on your decisions and partly on the
decisions of others.
The entire experiment will take place through computer
terminals, and all interaction between you will take place
through the computers. It is important that you not talk or in
any way try to communicate with other subjects during the
experiment.
We will start with a brief instruction period. During this
instruction period, you will be given a complete description of
the experiment and will be shown how to use the computers.
If you have any questions during the instruction period, raise
your hand and your question will be answered so everyone
can hear.
During the computer instruction session, we will teach you
how to use the computer by going through a practice session.
We will go through this practice session very slowly and it is
important that you follow instructions exactly. Do not hit any
keys until you are told to do so, and when you are told to enter
information, type exactly what you are told to type. You are
not paid for the practice session.
We will first pass out the practice experiment record sheet,
on which you will record all of the results from this exper-
iment. Please record your name, the date, and your Social
Security number on the bottom of the sheet. Note that you
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have been assigned a color, either Red or Blue. The color is
written on top of the record sheet.
[PASS OUT RECORD SHEETS]
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO RECORD
INFORMATION]
[START PLDK SERVER PROGRAM ON
SERVER, IF NOT DONE ALREADY]
Please click on the ICON that says “PLDK client.” When
the computer prompts you for your name, type your full name,
your Social Security number, and click on your color. Then
click OK to confirm. If you have any questions about how to
do this, please raise your hand.
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO LOG ON]
You now see the experiment screen. You have each been
assigned to be either a RED subject or a BLUE subject in this
experiment. Your color as well as your subject ID number is
shown in the banner at the top of the screen. Please record
your subject ID number on your record sheet.
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO RECORD
INFORMATION]
Each of you has been matched by the computer with a
subject of the opposite color. If you are a BLUE subject,
you are matched with one of the other RED subjects. If you
are a RED subject, you are matched with one of the BLUE
subjects.
In the upper left part of the screen, you see a table.
[SHOW TABLE ON OVERHEAD PROJECTOR]
Will all subjects now move the mouse into the table and
click it. If you are a RED subject, one of the rows will be
highlighted. If you are a BLUE subject, one of the columns
will be highlighted.
Each of you is asked to make a choice, but please do not
do so at this time. If you are a RED subject, on the left of
the screen you are asked to please choose a row. If you are a
BLUE subject, you are asked to please choose a column. The
outcome, and your payoff, is determined by the cell in the
table that is chosen. In each cell of the table, the first number
is the payoff for the RED subject, and the second number is
the payoff to the BLUE subject.
[GO THROUGH A COUPLE CELLS
IN OVERHEAD TABLE TO EXPLAIN]
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO HIGHLIGHT
ROW OR COLUMN]
Will all RED subjects now please choose “B” and all
BLUE subjects please choose “A” by clicking the mouse but-
ton now while the arrow is pointing to the appropriate row
or column. After you have made your choice, you are given
a chance to confirm your decision. If it is not correct, please
change it. When it is correct, please confirm by clicking on
“confirm” now.
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO CHOOSE
AND CONFIRM CHOICE]
[WALK AROUND ROOM TO CHECK]
After all subjects have confirmed their choices, the match
is over and you are shown the choice of the blue subject you
were matched with. The outcome of the round, BA, is now
highlighted in purple on everybody’s screen. Your earnings
are determined by the entries in the highlighted cell of the
table that was selected. So the payoff to a RED subject for
the first match is 6 points and the payoff to a BLUE subject
is 14 points. You are not being paid for the practice session,
but if this were the real experiment, then the payoff you have
recorded would be money you have earned from the first
match, in points.
We will now proceed to the second practice match. Each
match is the same except you are matched with a new subject
of the opposite color. Note that the decisions and payoffs
of the first match are recorded in the experiment history
at the right side of the screen. The outcomes of all of the
previous matches will be recorded at the right side of the
screen throughout the experiment so that you can refer back
to previous rounds whenever you like.
[HIT KEY TO START SECOND ROUND]
For the second match, each of you have now been re-
matched with a new subject of the opposite color. All RED
subjects again choose “B” and confirm. All BLUE subjects
choose “C” by clicking on the right column.
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO CHOOSE
AND CONFIRM CHOICE]
The payoff to a RED subject for this practice round is 8
points and the payoff to a BLUE subject is 12 points. This
concludes the second round. Notice that the results are again
recorded in the history screen. Note also that the history
screen keeps track of the number of times you have chosen
each row or column, and of the average payoff you received
from each row or column. For example, the red subject has
chosen “A” twice. The first time she received 6, and the second
time 8 points. So the average is 7.
[DO FOUR MORE ROUNDS, CHOOSING
(BA), (CC), (BB), (CA)]
[HIT KEY TO END PRACTICE SESSION]
This concludes the practice session. The computer screen
now indicates your total points that you earned in the practice
session. This is multiplied by the exchange rate to get your
money Payoff. Since this is a practice session, the exchange
rate is zero. In the actual experiment, the exchange rate is
0.01, so that each point is worth one cent.
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO RECORD
OUTCOME AND CLICK “OK”]
Part 1
The actual experiment consists of two parts. Each part will last
for 100 matches. When the first part is over, we will give you
some additional instructions before the second part begins.
Each match will proceed as in the first practice match, except
you will be paid one cent for each point. The table will have
three rows and three columns, the row and column labels will
be the same as the practice, and the payoffs in the table will
be the same as in the practice. Also, just like in the practice
round, you will be randomly rematched with a new subject of
the opposite color after each match.
The total amount you earn in this first part of the experi-
ment is equal to the sum of your earnings in all 100 matches.
You will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment. No
other participant will be told how much money you earned in
the experiment. You need not tell any other participants how
much you earned. Are there any questions before we begin
the experiment?
[TAKE QUESTIONS]
O.K., then we will now begin with the actual experiment.
Please lower your chairs to the lowest position, and pull out
88
American Political Science Review Vol. 98, No. 1
the dividers as far as they will go. This ensures your privacy
and the privacy of the others in the experiment. We will now
begin match number 1.
[START EXPERIMENT]
[AFTER FIRST MATCH ANNOUNCE:]
The first real match of the experiment is over. There will be
99 more matches in Part 1. Remember that you are randomly
rematched with a new subject after every single match. After
match 100 has finished, please record your total payoffs on
your record sheet and then wait for the instructions for the
second part of the experiment.
Part 2
This is the second and final part of the experiment. The
amount of money you earn in this part will be added to the
amount you earned in Part 1 to determine your total money
earnings for the whole experiment. Just as in Part 1, each
point is worth one cent. This part of the experiment is similar
to the first part, except the payoff table has been changed in
a very specific way.
[SHOW NEW TABLE ON OVERHEAD
PROJECTOR NEXT TO OLD TABLE]
This is a payoff table that reverses the roles of Blue and
Red. That is, Blue’s payoffs are the same as Reds payoffs were
in Part 1, and Red’s payoffs are the same as Blue’s payoffs
were in Part 1. For example, suppose that Blue chooses A
and Red chooses B. Then Blue gets 6 and Red gets 14. Now
compare this to the payoffs in the first table, when Red chose
A and Blue chose B.
[PUT UP COMBINED SLIDE
WITH BOTH PAYOFFS]
Then Red got 6 and Blue got 14. If you look carefully at
the new table, you will notice that it is derived from the old
one by transposing it (that is, flipping it around the diagonal)
and reversing the Red and Blue payoffs.
[ILLUSTRATE HOW THIS TRANSPOSITION
WORKS USING OVERHEADS]
Are there any questions before we begin?
[TAKE QUESTIONS]
O.K., then we will now begin the second part. The second
part will also have 100 matches. Remember that you are ran-
domly rematched with a new subject after every single match.
After match 100 has finished, please record your Part 2 total
payoffs on your record sheet and then wait for instructions
for how to be paid. We ask you to refrain from talking with
each other, not only during the matches, but also while you
are waiting to be paid. Thank you in advance for your coop-
eration.
[BEGIN SECOND PART]
[END AFTER MATCH 100]
The experiment is now over. Please record your Part 2
money earnings and add them to your Part 1 money earnings.
Enter this sum in the row labeled Total Earnings. You will be
paid this amount of money in the next room. We will pay you
one at a time, beginning with subject number 1. We ask you
not to talk with each other or use the computer equipment
while you are waiting to be paid. Subject number 1, will you
please come with us to the next room. Please collect your
belongings and bring them and your record sheet with you.
You will be leaving from the outside door in the next room.
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